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In defiance of the romantic tranquillity of their mythology, historically islands 
have been places of violence. Because of their rigid boundaries, shifting 
strategic significance  and small areas, islands have been subject to 
intensive socio-cultural encounters and political annexation, rendering them 
particularly useful lenses into the impact of colonialism and globalisation, as 
several new analyses have revealed. In historiographical terms, various 
disciplinary trajectories, especially world history, are now flooded with 
oceanic histories which seek to map connections across the water and to 
trace transnational and transcontinental relations.2 As Wigen argues, 
previously intractably land-driven conceptions are eroding as the sea 
appears on the horizon.3 The history of the world is being retold from the 
point of view of the sea. However, not just the oceanic currents and routes, 
but the islands too are critical in understanding global trends. Edmond and 
Smith have urged “island-centred theorising”.4 Islands certainly prove useful 
in understanding the long history of labour oppression. The narratives of 
labour, indenture and servitude are critical as new systems of labour 
emerged after the abolition of Atlantic slavery.5 The making and 
management of "coolie labour" in the Cape and Ichaboe trade is an under-
researched topic in labour studies, and even under-represented in research 
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within international guano labour studies. “Coolies” and related labour 
identities such as “kanakas”, are both designative and pejorative terms, 
describing firstly a “low class of worker” and secondly, representing a 
racialised understanding of certain groups of workers, either non-white or 
from Asian origins and their linkages to particular jobs. Due to its 
widespread geographical appearance and the harsh exploitation associated 
with its presence, the term “coolies” has over time acquired a transnational 
character.6 Balachandran (among others) has described the term as 
indicative of a exploitative social relationship between guanopreneurs and 
their workforce.7 Indeed, Phillips has argued that the guano labour regime of 
the mid-nineteenth century, with its repressive labour practices, came to 
represent a new form of slavery.8 They make the argument that the resultant 
struggle of the labour force to reappropriate the fruits of their labour can be 
viewed as essentially a struggle against “coolification” and the prevention of 
the erosion of their right to choose their conditions of employment. As such, 
it was also actions taken to counter attempts at their “unmaking” as free 
workers.9 Glasco has contended that their’s was a fundamental fight for the 
restoration of their own understanding of their worth as men.10 
 
Although, as we will demonstrate, the Cape trade shared 
commonalities with the international trade, it also exhibited a strongly 
idiographic locatedness. The nature and organisation of the African trade 
was fundamentally influenced by its location; the natural features of the 
offshore islands; its distance from its supply headquarters (see map, Figure 
I, below); the economics of the trade; and the very nature of guano labour 
itself. The usefulness of the explanation offered by Balachandran and 
Phillips of labour conflict within the international trade will be assessed 
against the development of local labour regimes and resistance during the 
period 1843–1910.  
 
Guano collection and the nature of the guano work environment  
 
Guano-mining and trading in the mid to late 19th century was a speculative 
activity because it dealt with the collection and trade of a finite product 
founded on various offshore islands.11 The quality of the product was 
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10.  J.D. Glasco, “The Seaman Feels Himself a Man”, International Labor and Working-
class History, 66, Fall, 2004. 
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nineteenth century, the pioneers referred to the self-demarcated exploitation areas 
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entirely dependent on the right combination of chemical elements 
(phosphate, ammonia, nitrogen) essential for plant growth. The profitability 
of the entire industry therefore depended on the adoption of a low cost and 
labour-intensive system of operation.12 Guanopreneurs followed other 
extractive enterprises based on natural plunder, like their gold mining 
counterparts in Southern Rhodesia who were involved in gathering another 
scattered natural product during the late nineteenth century. Low-grade 
mining entrepreneurs positioned themselves as individual small producers 
using essentially their own financial resources and worked the islands as 
individual “business” units.13 This method not only necessitated merely a 
small capital outlay but also proved a more practical way of cutting costs.  
 
 
 
Map 1: Ichaboe Islands14 
 
The African guano trade which began on the Namib coast in 1843, 
was located in a harsh area which generally consisted of angry surf, barren 
rocks, arid sand hills and little vegetation.15 The territorial islands such as 
Malgas and Bird Island, although closer to Cape Town were still located in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
collection of guano as a mining activity although the capital invested in these 
operations was essentially merchant rather than mining capital. Furthermore, those 
involved in the physical removal of the product were referred to as “labourers” and 
“sailors”, not diggers or miners. See Ex-member of the Committee, “The African 
Guano Trade: Being an Account of the Trade in Guano from Ichaboe, and Other 
Places on the African Coast, more Particularly the Proceedings of the Committee 
of Management”, in Nautical Magazine, 16, 1845, pp 617–666. 
12. C. van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900–1933 
(Pluto Press, London, 1976), p 100. 
13. Van Onselen, Chibaro, p 21. 
14. The map of the Ichaboe and surrounding islands was drawn by Marius Meiring, 
chief information officer at Saldanha Bay Municipality and is based on L. Berat, 
Walvis Bay: The Last Frontier (Radix, Sandton, 1990), p 197. 
15. Ex-Member of the Committee,“The African Guano Trade”, p 641. 
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relatively underdeveloped territories with no harbour facilities. Both 
exploitation zones lacked an adequate fresh water supply.16 Where water 
could be found, it was generally salt and brackish.17 This meant water had 
to be imported in bulk from Cape Town. Provisioning ships were frequently 
in a poor condition with leaky hulls, which caused the water transported in 
wooden casks to become spoiled. Its further conveyance by raft to the 
mainland also compromised its long-term preservation since seawater 
contamination caused it to become malodorous and virtually undrinkable.18 
To survive, workers frequently had to boil salt water to secure a sufficient 
potable supply.19 Life under these circumstances was extremely precarious. 
 
The primary task of guano workers was the physical collection, 
bagging and loading of guano with the aid of basic tools such as crowbars, 
spades and wheelbarrows. To assist with loading and conveyance, they 
constructed numerous improvisations such as a swinging platform and a 
primitive railway system.20 Unpredictable and poor weather conditions 
turned guano collection into a slow, frustrating and dangerous task and 
heightened the possibility of collapsing guano heaps.21 The islands, without 
exception, lacked access to medical care. Where medicine was available on 
board ship, its efficacy was compromised by seawater contamination as well 
as rat and vermin infestation during transportation.22 There were no 
bandages, dispensing manuals or any surgical instruments available for use 
in case of emergencies.23 Aside from accidental injury, guano-mining 
caused colds, sore throats, rheumatism and agues (a fever or shivering fit) 
whilst the ammonia-laden excrement and guano dust also caused constant 
bleeding of the eyes and nostrils.24 Since nose-bleeding was also one of the 
tell-tale signs of scurvy,25 its occurrence was easily mistaken for the onset of 
the dreaded disease. 
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The availability of fresh vegetables and lime juice in particular was 
critical for the prevention of scurvy.26 The spoilage of both fresh water and 
meat after its removal from the casks, was a serious health problem and 
also became a significant cost factor.27 The maintenance of a regular 
provisioning system was key to sucessfully exploiting the guano islands. 
Robert Granger, one of the local guanopreneurs estimated the cost of 
maintaining a workforce as ranging between £60 and £70 per year (salaries 
and provisions included).28 
 
Providing accommodation for the workforce on the islands was a 
major challenge since the hard and rocky island surface made the erection 
of proper brick structures impossible. Workers were therefore housed in a 
variety of structures ranging from small one-roomed wooden structures with 
a galvanised or tarpaulin roof, without proper flooring and glassless 
windows, to an old sail, supported by oars or empty cement casks.29 The 
absence of stoves; constantly leaking roofs; and a shortage of coal and 
firewood also made life extremely unpleasant and denied workers a 
measure of heat and comfort.30 The absence of any form of recreation and 
leisure activities added to this misery, especially for those (admittedly few) 
literate individuals who specifically expressed a need for such literature.31 
Thus the islands were, as guano digger J.H. Mitchell lamented, a “wretched 
placed for men to live”.32 
 
The ad hoc labour regime, 1843–1845 
 
The early guano labour system in Africa was designed by the shipmasters 
who participated in the guano rush during the period 1843 to 1845. Owing to 
its ruthless efficiency, serving the economic objectives of both businessmen 
and the Cape colonial state, it endured for more than two generations. From 
the outset, sailors were the primary source of labour for guano-loading. 
Their ranks were often supplemented by groups of contracted non-seamen 
working under the supervision of super cargoes to speed up the loading 
process. This practice closely mirrored the Peruvian system prior to the 
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importation of Chinese workers and the introduction of the “coolie” labour 
regime from the late 1820s.33 
 
The crewmen on European ships were recruited in a variety of ways 
and their conditions of employment were regulated by law and enforced by 
the Cape courts. Typically, the bulk was recruited from the ranks of 
deserters or the unemployed and those wanting to escape from society.34 
All that shipmasters had to do was to give notice of their need for new 
recruits. A significant number of men therefore simply ended up on the 
guano islands after having responded to the shouts of recruiters while 
“standing about the jetty with some mate”.35 The unemployed were in no 
position to negotiate a reasonable wage.36 Crucially, they were also kept 
ignorant about the nature of guano collection and the expected living 
conditions on the islands. In terms of their contracts, they were supposed to 
load and discharge all cargo if required – an “odious task” at best.37 They 
were also expected to demonstrate an unquestioned obedience to their 
shipmaster. This effectively turned them into cheap labour, and shipmasters 
into “masters next to God”.38 
 
The maritime laws coupled with the unwritten practices and accepted 
traditions of the nineteenth-century shipping trade empowered shipmasters 
to act autonomously. Crewmen were placed at the receiving end of scarcely 
disguised attempts to turn them into cheap and irregularly paid labour. 
Dangerous working conditions, paltry salaries and deferred wages were also 
common features of their working-life and the exchange of promissory notes 
between shipmasters, as surety for work to be done, offered no guarantee 
for the honouring of these agreements.39 When the situation demanded, 
shipmasters deliberately contracted day workers (at a cheaper rate of 3s/5d) 
to accelerate the collection and loading of freight.40 
 
Non-payment and the deferment of wages represented serious 
attacks on the ability of seamen to negotiate as free workers. Speculating 
entrepreneurs often used these measures as a mechanism to reduce the 
incidence of desertion or in the hope of securing a financial windfall or early 
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40.  Craig, “The African Guano Trade”, p 45. 
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return from their enterprise.41 There were some cases of sailors refusing to 
work or deserting to work as day workers at the improved wage rate. These 
actions were consistent with trends elsewhere, like Canadian timber ports, 
where (as Fingard has shown) seamen, contracted to do work that they 
normally loathed as articled seamen, found it “quite palatable” in small 
doses as hired labour.42 At first these were small acts of defiance which 
stopped just short of more serious challenges such as mutiny. The 
continued exploitation and poor working conditions, however, took a turn for 
the worse in March and April 1844 when the sailors on Ichaboe revolted and 
established a guano republic, defying the shipmasters. A similar mutiny 
erupted on Malgas Island the following year. 
 
The troubles at both Ichaboe and Malgas Island had their origin in the 
introduction of a system of supercargoes and contract manual labour as 
opposed to sea labour. Following their earlier experiences, those returning 
to Ichaboe were accompanied by groups of manual labourers to fast-track 
the loading of vessels chartered in England. The supercargoes responsible 
for supervising the loading, together with the Committee of Shipmasters and 
Others (COSMO) and which represented a minority of the shipmasters 
present, monopolised certain loading stages in order to prioritise the loading 
of pre-arranged chartered vessels. In addition to long delays, independent 
shipmasters had to pay for a guano load as well as having to assist others 
with loading before they could secure a load of their own. In the midst of 
internecine conflict over these arrangements, a large number of sailors 
deserted to “Supercargo Town” to work as day labourers at a higher wage. 
This forced the affected shipmasters to act in their own interest. In mid-1845 
and with the assistance of 1 400 loyal crewmen from an estimated 300 
crews present at the island, they attacked “Supercargo Town” and 
 
its entire population put to the rout at the point of the bayonet, and driven 
directly into the sea up to their chins, and the discomfitted landlords there 
and then made to swear, that from henceforth they had relinquished all right 
and title to the soil of Ichaboe, after which declaration they were permitted to 
return to their respective place of abode. This summary proceeding produced 
an entire change in the civil affairs of the island.43 
 
This victory was however of short duration. With the arrival of the 
warship HMS Thunderbolt in May 1844, the COSMO was restructured and a 
new set of rules implemented. Not only was the original labour regime of 
strict contract enforcement, alcohol rations, fixed working hours and 
evacuation of all crews from the island at the end of the work day re-
established, but all deserters had to re-join their original crew. These 
instructions caused significant dissatisfaction amongst the workforce. The 
labourers in particular regarded the combined actions of both the groups of 
shipmasters and loyal crewmen as a serious threat to their interests. 
                                                            
41.  Van Onselen, Chibaro, p 100. 
42.  Fingard, “The Decline of the Sailor as a Ship Labourer”, pp 38–39. 
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Although these arrangements were kept in place by subsequent naval 
crews of the HMS Clio and Isis, their presence was of a short duration. As a 
result, with their departure by July, the recalcitrant element among the crews 
and ordinary labours regrouped and mutinied.44 In addition to constituting 
themselves as a “sort of sovereign authority”, they elected one of their 
number, the best boxer on the island as “King of Ichaboe” and physically 
denied shipmasters access to the island.45 They also forced the shipmasters 
to pay between 7 and 8 shillings per ton of guano.This situation, which 
lasted for nearly six months was only reversed with the return of HMS 
Thunderbolt in December 1844 to restore the general order, arrest the 
ringleaders and to supervise the final scraping of the island.The act of 
establishing a republic or “kingdom” represented an extreme act of symbolic 
or ideological resistance against attempts to relegate workers to an inferior 
economic and social or ritual position.46 In confronting the Committee of 
Shipmasters and Others (COSMO), the rebelling seaman displayed, as 
Scott has argued in another context, not only their immediate discontent but 
also an incipient sense of class-consciousness.47 Their actions represented 
more than an attempt to re-appropriate the product of their labour but also 
expressed their particular world view;48 offered a radical critique of the 
existing arrangements;49 and was an attempt to reclaim their status as men 
of worth. This is evident in the utterings of a number of the ordinary guano 
diggers. Joseph Fletcher, a guano digger on Possession Island, who not 
only confronted his supervisor about the quality of food by demanding to 
know “whether the food was fit to give a man after working hard all day?”, 
but also expressed his disgust with the available drinking water which in his 
view was “not fit for a human being to drink”.50 Similarly, Anthony Rodericks 
declared his material interest when he stated simply: “I struck for wages this 
time.”51 In the same vein, Alfred Kaiser made it clear that the system of 
credit extended to guano workers was exploitive since “we pay dear for 
them, and our wages are but small”.52 
 
Viewed from this perspective, their actions thus represented both a 
struggle for economic redress and an embryonic class consciousness in 
insisting on a measure of political equality above (and off) deck. Arguably, it 
                                                            
44.  “The Guano Trade”, Courier, 29 October 1844. 
45.  “On Guano: Its Origins and History”, The Inquirer & Commercial News, 3 October 
1855. 
46.  J.C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1985), p 235. 
47.  Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p 297. 
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1856–c.1956”, PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 1992, p 57. 
49.  Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p 339. 
50.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence of J. Fletcher, 
22 July 1897. 
51.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence of A. 
Rodericks, 30 July 1897. 
52.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence of A. Kaiser, 
30 July 1897. 
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also represented a new and different vision of the existing social order, 
namely one of men receiving more equitable treatment between the 
classes.53 British crewmen in particular, had long struggled to elevate their 
social status and to counter the attitude that relegated them to “inhabitants 
of the imperial periphery” not “worthy of the guarantees associated with 
metropolitan freedom (‘British liberty’)”.54Their unambiguous declaration 
through radical collective actions was therefore not only a clear expression 
of their entitlement, but also an attempt at reclaiming their rights as British 
citizens.  
 
The rebelling seamen were contracted maritime labour and their 
actions – as far as their employers were concerned – were mutinous and 
constituted acts of theft and were therefore punishable by law.55 These 
sentiments were explicitly expressed by captains Broderick of the Star of the 
West and Tasker of the brig Leila who respectively observed that “there are 
present … many more common men than officers ... and the consequence 
is that a mutiny is a matter of daily occurrence” and “the outmost possible 
anarchy reigned amongst the crews of the numerous vessels lying there, 
notwithstanding the regulations which had been established”.56 Similarly, 
James Seawright, reporting from Malgas Island in May 1845, stated it in no 
uncertain terms: “that the conduct of some of these crews and the whole of 
the European labours is so mutinous that your humblest are afraid to visit 
the island to superintend their crews and labourers”.57 When the ship 
captains turned to the Cape Colony, Mauritius and St Helena Island as well 
as the naval authorities for assistance, they found them willing accomplices. 
The Cape courts not only sentenced the rebellious sailors to short periods of 
imprisonment, spare diets of rice and water, but also fined or dismissed 
them.58 The recalcitrant received not only physical punishment but were 
often left in an open boat out in the unpredictable ocean.59 
 
Yet, significantly, most of the penalties were not harsh. This was a 
result of simple pragmatism rather than mercy: experienced and skilled 
seamen were hard to replace. The payment of one’s own passage, 
however, was particularly steep and unpleasant since mutinous crew were 
frequently returned in chains to their port of origin and also had to work for 
meagre rations. Most ordinary seamen had very little spare money and 
could therefore hardly afford to pay their own way. The use of this range of 
penalties as outlined was deployed to contain open protest and defiance. 
Alongside sporadic harsh retribution, a regime of routine repression aimed 
                                                            
53.  Glasco, “The Seaman Feels Himself a Man”, p 47. 
54.  I. Land, “Customs of the Sea: Flogging, Empire, and the ‘True British Seaman’ 
1770–1870”, Interventions, 3, 4, August 2001, pp 169–185. 
55.  Ex-Member of the Committee, “The African Guano Trade”, p 636. 
56.  Craig, “The African Guano Trade”, pp 40 and 44. 
57.  KAB: CO. 4027/578, J. Seawright 7 Co. – Government, 17 May 1845. 
58.  Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, 28 March 1845. 
59.  L. Green, Panther Head (Stanley Paul & Co, Cape Town, 1955), p 229. 
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at sowing fear rather than spreading terror.60 This is demonstrated by the 
cases reported in the various issues of the Cape of Good Hope & Port Natal 
Mercantile Gazette as well as from others such as the South Australian 
Register.61 Whilst Charles Thompson and Peter Wilson of the schooner Ann 
were punished with 14 days of imprisonment and a spare diet of rice and 
water every second day for refusing to perform their duty on board ship, 
William Davis and William Nasin of the barque Abel Gower, were merely 
placed back on board after committing the same offence.62 Similarly, John 
Barry, Thomas Williams and James Toby who committed the more serious 
offence of deserting from the guano vessel, Anlaby, were imprisoned for 
one month supplemented by a spare diet every second day.63 They, 
however, remained in the service of their respective employers. Yet when 
James Curtis, a chief mate on the brig Acorn used abusive and threatening 
language against the shipmaster, he was summarily discharged.64 These 
cases clearly demonstrate how the application of the various measures 
therefore aided rather than undermined the collection, loading and shipping 
process.  
 
The seasonal labour regime, 1847–1890 
With the exhaustion of the resource in 1845 in both the bay of Angra 
Pequena and within the Cape territorial waters, the ad hoc labour regime 
came to its end. As the trade moved into its next phase and control passed 
into the hands of Cape businessmen, a system of seasonal labour was 
introduced. With the first signs of a replenished guano resource, the 
Liverpool firm of Gibson, Linton & Co. monopolised Ichaboe in 1847. To 
safeguard their interests, they appointed a supervisor or foreman for 
supervising the collection and loading as well as to maintain the peace.65 
Working from Liverpool their control, however, was of short duration. As a 
result of a combination of factors, including the death of one of the partners 
and financial difficulties, control of Ichaboe Island passed into the hands of a 
group of Cape businessmen including Robert Granger, Aaron and Elias de 
Pass, and Seawright & Co., some of whom were actively involved with the 
former regime of exploitation. 
 
The new monopolists, increasingly aware of the need to protect the 
seabirds and specifically their guano, which was deposited on a cyclical 
basis, introduced a system of seasonal labour under the supervision of 
European headmen. They were tasked with recruitment, supervision, 
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provisions management and reporting to their Cape Town headquarters.66 
Although they were generally chosen from the ranks of the most 
experienced seamen available, literacy levels were low and most had to be 
assisted to execute their administrative duties adequately.67 However they 
received a remuneration package consisting of commission between six 
pence (6d) and one shilling per ton;68 an additional gratuity based on the 
loading speed of the workforce under their supervision;69 and a sealing 
concession for their own account.70 These arrangements gave them a direct 
interest in maximising production. 
 
As had become standard practice, labour was recruited from among a 
cross-section of Cape colonial society. Within these ranks were deserters, 
tradesmen, former public servants and even a former barrister.71 Prisoners 
with the option of a fine were recruited from the Roeland Street Prison in 
exchange for a twelve-month guano contract.72 Contemporary reports 
therefore painted a picture of a recruiting system geared towards securing 
as cheap a labour force as possible.73 
 
Working as day labourers, guano scrapers were paid an average 
wage of £2 per month.74 This was supplemented by an extra three pence 
(3d) per ton depending on the loading speed as well as water and food 
rations.75 A system of monthly “half pay notes”, allowing workers to 
                                                            
66.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence of J.E. Sayer, 
30 July 1897.  
67.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
A. Chimato, 22 July 1897. 
68.  KAB: AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/1/9: SC. A.11–’61: Testimony of J. Sheperd, p. 7. 
69.  KAB: AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/1/9: SC. A.11 – ’61: Testimony of J. Spence, p. 25. 
70.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
J. Ployer, 30 July 1897.  
71.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence of W. 
Fieldman, 30 July 1897. 
72.  Green, Panther Head, p 23. 
73.  There is a rich variety of contemporary and unpublished primary testimony on the 
living and working conditions on the various islands in the various archives groups 
at the Cape Town Archives Depot. Most was not published consistently nor 
attached to the final reports of the Commissions of Inquiry into the management of 
the government guano Islands. The testimony underpinning, the 1897 
investigation, filed under the archive group Agriculture (AGR), forms the basis of 
this study due to its richness and depth as well as constant reference and 
comparison between the labour and living regimes under the private leaseholders 
in comparison to that of the government guano agent. The testimony of the labour 
force presented to the Angra Pequena and West Coast Joint Claims Commission 
in 1885/86 and which preceded the era of government control over the islands, 
deals more with the issues of territorial control and jurisdiction prior to the advent 
of German influence in the area along the Namib coast than with the actual detail 
of the living and working conditions on the islands. 
74.  KAB: AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/1/9: SC. A.11–’61, Testimony of B. Sinclair, p 19. 
75.  KAB: AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/1/9: SC. A.11–’61: Testimony of  B. Sinclair, p 25. 
62
Discontented Scoundrels 
62 
exchange half of their future pay to order goods, was also introduced.76 A 
worker was therefore (theoretically) able to leave the islands having secured 
some savings from his labour. However, the “half-pay” system was also a 
valuable mechanism to control the labour force. By having a portion of their 
wages withheld, deserters faced losing a significant amount in accumulated 
earnings. This effectively compelled guano labourers to work out their full 
contract.  
 
To strengthen their hold over labour even further, employers extended 
credit to the workforce. Most workers generally had very few worldly 
possessions. Since employers provided only food and quarters, basic items 
such as basins, towels, soap, matches and blankets as well as non-food 
products (such as tobacco) had to be procured from the ship’s store.77 The 
only other alternative for purchasing provisions was a store on the mainland 
operated by De Pass, Spence & Co., who guarded their monopoly 
jealously.78 Workers and visiting crew therefore faced a choice of either 
paying or having their ablutions with a salt water guano bath and using the 
yolk of penguin eggs as soap.79 This led George Fry, a guano digger on 
Possession Island, to observe: “we almost live in a salt atmosphere here; 
we have to wash … [ourselves] and our clothes in salt water, and eat salt 
provisions.”80 Nor was there “a glass of liquor now and then” that “would 
cheer the men up”.81 
 
Given the value of alcohol and tobacco as potential mechanisms to 
aid control of the workforce, most employers strictly rationed these 
commodities, especially alcohol. A regular supply of tobacco could, 
however, be procured from either the ship’s store or from the De Pass 
establishment on the mainland.82 These two products provided a deeply 
desired – albeit temporary – respite from the isolated and miserable 
existence. Given the unreliability of the supply system and the regular 
shortages that resulted, some workers resorted to drinking friar’s balsam, 
paregoric and other medical remedies with an alcohol base.83 The islands, 
from the workers’ perspective, were a “wretched place for men to live”.84 
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As a result of their personal circumstances and employers’ access to 
a combination of civil law (contracts) and criminal law (“prosecution for 
vagrancy and deviance from an orderly life on and off the job”),85 guano 
labourers found themselves in Bittermann’s words, with reference to the 
situation of agricultural settlers in Cape Breton, Canada, in an “inescapable 
conundrum”.86 Not in a position to negotiate a reasonable wage, most also 
had nowhere else to go.87 As Newton-King has argued, those recruited with 
the assistance of crimps such as “Black Sophie” Nielson of Brëe Street in 
Cape Town and other intermediaries as “stock-in-trade” labour, were also 
caught in a web of debt.88 The Masters and Servants Act promulgated in 
1873 by the Cape government outlawed “careless work”, bad language or 
“neglect” and absence from work and threatened short periods of 
imprisonment and fines for any of these infringements.89 It therefore 
assisted in constructing an effective though low-cost, coercive infrastructure 
and management system for the continuous exploitation of the islands. By 
the end of the 1880s and concomitant with the growing unhappiness of the 
seasonal labour force, its internal deficiencies, however, slowly began to 
show. Political factors and the establishment of a state-controlled guano 
agency system brought the period of private control to an end and 
inaugurated a new state-controlled labour dispensation. 
 
The labour regime under the Cape guano agent, 1890–1898 
 
After four decades of private exploitation and following persistent pressure 
from the farming community for cheap fertiliser, the Cape Legislative 
Council by way of Resolution 2 of 2 July 1889, took operational control of 
the trade. The Department of Crown Lands and Public Works (DCLPW) 
then appointed Captain C.H. Jackson on a commission basis as the 
government guano agent responsible for the overall management of the 
islands. In this role he was responsible for budgeting, labour recruitment 
and the management of the central guano depot in Cape Town where the 
different guano types were to be mixed, weighed and despatched. Having a 
free hand to organise the guano administration, he appointed Captain John 
Spence as the assistant guano agent responsible for supervising the actual 
collection on the various islands and overseeing the supply ship, the Sea 
Bird. 
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The new guano administration followed a similar recruitment strategy 
as their predecessors by targeting the unemployed and those formerly 
employed by the former leaseholders.90 Additional workers, particularly 
women, were also recruited from among the large number of indigenous 
people (Hottentots) on the Namibian mainland.91 Although this was not a 
new development, the targeting of the indigenous women was a new 
practice since they were regarded as ideal workers for removing stones 
from the guano whereas the men were used for the “rough work”.92 They 
were not only considered diligent and cheap workers, but also easy to 
exploit.93 Payment promised ranged from rice and coffee94 to a cash wage 
of 5 shillings per month in comparison to the £2 paid to the white guano 
digger.95 The only exception in the treatment of indigenous men was in the 
case of those individuals who worked as cooks who were at least offered a 
pay-off prior to being landed on the mainland.96 
 
By comparison to the former system of short term contracts, the new 
dispensation provided for 12 month contracts to coincide with the breeding 
and collection season.97 Longer term, open-ended contracts were the 
exception and were only entered into with the most seasoned individuals 
who preferred an island existence.98 These men who boasted long years of 
working in the trade, were also regarded as essential for ensuring the long-
term sustainability of the industry and the protection of the seabirds. 
Remuneration for headmen, however, was fixed on £4 and that of the 
ordinary worker decreased by 10 pence to £2 per month.99 None were 
allowed any bargaining space.100 This system almost immediately generated 
a cost saving since it was much cheaper than the former commission-based 
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system. Additionally, both categories of workers lost the right to collect 
sealskins for their own account and therefore also the opportunity to 
establish some form of economic independence. 
 
The system of “half pay notes” was also terminated since all islands 
were to be provisioned from Cape Town. With the employer paying for all 
food and accommodation, salaries were only paid upon termination of 
service.101 The deferment of the payday forced workers to procure life’s 
necessities on credit at inflated prices from the stores of the Sea Bird. This 
not only increased their indebtedness but also effectively prevented early 
termination of the service contract. To aggravate matters, the price of 
tobacco was increased from 2 shillings and 6 pence (2/6) to 4 shillings,102 
which – according to guano digger Alfred Kaiser – was “a disgrace in the 
nineteenth century”.103 
 
From their recruitment to the termination of their contract, recruits 
were still subjected to the harsh living and working conditions experienced 
under the earlier labour regimes. Upon their departure for the islands, the 
new workers had to sleep in makeshift beds, on water barrels, on top of 
each other on the deck and even in the lifeboats of a leaking ship.104 This 
particular feature of their transportation mirrored the transport system of the 
slave trade and therefore buttresses Phillip’s description of the guano trade 
as a new form of slavery. The treatment meted out to the indigenous 
workers was equally bad. Having served the purpose for which they were 
hired but also with due consideration for the fact that the prior approval of 
the German colonial administration for the hire of indigenous labour was not 
obtained, their contracts were prematurely terminated and a group of 63 
individuals unceremoniously repatriated to the mainland without any of the 
promised financial compensation in February 1896.105 Only a threat of 
diplomatic action by the German colonial authorities and the payment of 
financial compensation to the amount of £350 for damages, resolved the 
matter.106 
 
To establish a disciplined work force, “curb idleness” and to achieve 
maximum productivity, the guano agency implemented a strict regulatory 
framework. A 12 hour workday stretching from daybreak to sundown with 
provision for a ninety minute breakfast and a dinner hour, was implemented. 
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However, no break for a midday meal,107 or a legally enforceable 
compulsory rest day was allowed. Workers could not accurately determine 
the length of their workday since they were denied access to a clock.108 
Furthermore, strict contract enforcement and threats of imprisonment were 
used to discourage desertion.109 Contracted labour had thus no option other 
than to work out their contracts and to wait for the Sea Bird to return them to 
Cape Town. As a result of this strict regime, the administration was able to 
collect nearly 26 000 tons of guano over the first six years (1890–1896) of 
its existence.110 On the remuneration side, comparatively speaking, the 
guano agent and his assistant jointly earned commissions of over £9 000 
whilst the island labour force comprising 220 individuals, earned just over 
£19 000 as outlined in the table below.  
 
 
Table 1: Comparative annual earnings: Guano agent commission vs. island 
workforce116 
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YEAR 
ANNUAL GUANO 
AGENT 
COMMISSION 
ANNUAL ISLAND WORKFORCE 
WAGES 
AMOUNTS IN POUND STERLING 
1893111 £1,012. 2s .3d £2,528.10s. 5d 
1894112 £1,545. 9s. 3d £2,425. 3s.1d 
1895113 £1,615. 8s.1d £4,360. 6s. 7d 
1896114 £2,035. 14s. 4d £5,592.18s. 7d 
1897115 £2,486. 15s. 0d £4,233. 6s. 0d 
TOTAL £8,693. 48s. 11d £19,138. 43s. 20d 
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Although the matter that finally tipped the scale was the cavalier 
disregard for the welfare of the workers and the careless handling of the 
island supply system by the guano agent, the growing demand of Cape 
farmers for a cheap and accessible supply of guano for agricultural 
purposes also played a role. As indicated, the uninterrupted supply from the 
islands was a critical element in the workings of the islands. Delays in the 
provision of fresh food and water therefore had to be prevented at all times 
since it also negatively impacted on worker productivity and the availability 
of the product. Jackson, due to the commission arrangements in his 
employment contract, were, however, set on further cost reductions without 
seriously considering its destabilising effect. To curb costs and eliminate 
waste, headmen were instructed to optimise available provisions of salted 
meat (both pork and beef) due to its high price.117 They were to refrain from 
buying meat from the mainland without prior approval. Any unauthorised 
expenditure in this regard was to be recovered from the salary of the 
responsible party.118 A ban was also placed on the collection of penguin 
eggs and the killing of penguins for food since they represented the future of 
the industry. This situation, according to guano digger Joseph Fletcher of 
Possession Island, “was not extra good” and “altogether disgraceful for an 
Englishman”.119 The further decision to discontinue employing a dedicated 
cook at an additional cost had serious health implications. As has been 
noted in other contexts, overcooking food considerably reduces its anti-
scorbutic properties.120 The men were unskilled at catering for themselves 
and their meals became inedible.121 Since the majority also had little money 
due to the system of deferred payment, they could not purchase the 
required health (indeed, life) sustaining foods from the nearby trading store.  
 
The restrictions on additional procurement were also extended to the 
purchase of drug foods such as tea, coffee and alcohol. In addition to 
banning alcohol, Chinese tea was replaced by bush tea (according to the 
available evidence, not rooibos tea) which was much disliked by the 
diggers. T.L. Graham, a member of a later parliamentary investigation 
committee, described the bush tea as a “nauseas beverage with nothing to 
recommend it but its cheapness”.122 The banning of alcohol was particularly 
hard and led Gustav Haggerstrom, the headman of Sinclair and Plum 
Pudding Island, to remark that “now the men have to live here like 
convicts”.123 It was, therefore, not surprising that during 1897 after weeks of 
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non-delivery, the workforce decided to act. This is not to suggest that the 
actions that followed were the first display of unhappiness and show of 
resistance. Resistance to their working and living conditions, as will be 
shown, evolved slowly and grew progressively from subtle forms of protest 
to direct challenges of the system. 
 
Worker resistance and reaction to the guano labour system  
 
The changes that accompanied the establishment of the guano agency, 
especially its remuneration dispensation, had led to the exit of some of the 
most experienced men from the system. The majority of them found 
employment almost immediately with the nearby Cape Cross Guano 
Company, which offered both improved provisions and a better monthly 
salary of £5.124 Others, including veterans of the trade, simply returned to 
Cape Town.125 This trend continued throughout the period of state control so 
that by the outbreak of the South African War in 1899, an acute labour 
shortage was experienced.126 Those who did not leave frequently resorted 
to “loafing” and excuses of an inability to work the usual way.127 This forced 
the renewed recruitment of indigenous labour at 20 shillings per labourer.128 
Cost reductions therefore left the collection system vulnerable and 
dependent on an uncertain labour supply.  
 
The system of regular reporting through the headman and the captain 
of the supply ship Sea Bird began to break down over time. Given the high 
incidence of illiteracy amongst headmen, their record-keeping was for the 
most part incomplete. Those headmen who wanted to visit Cape Town in 
order to directly communicate their concerns were dissuaded from doing so 
by Captain Burr of the Sea Bird, who instead undertook to relay it on their 
behalf.129 Burr, however, failed to submit any written complaint and in his 
own words generally only “mentioned” his observations and the men’s 
complaints.130 Given his own role in exploiting the men through credit sales 
from the ship’s store, this was not surprising. When a written report indeed 
reached Cape Town, no response was ever received.131 The guano agent 
failed to visit the islands under his jurisdiction; nor did he interact directly 
                                                            
124.  KAB: AGR: 667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
A. Rodericks, 30 July 1897. 
125.  KAB: AGR: 667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
P. Nelson, 30 July 1897. 
126.  KAB: AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/2/1/48: SC. A.12–’97: Testimony of Jackson, p 6. 
127.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
F.P. Jameson, 30 July 1897. 
128.  KAB: AGR 1/511: D18, Inspection of Guano Islands: W.P. Truter – Colonial 
Secretary’s Office, 19 October 1905. 
129.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
M. Pietersen, 22 July 1897. 
130.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
Capt. Burr, 22 July 1897. 
131.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
A. Kaiser, 30 July 1897. 
69
Discontented Scoundrels 
69 
with his headmen.132 Acting as a “general overlord”, and displaying a 
heightened sense of his own superiority, power, importance and entitlement 
to deference, the guano agent insulted and dismissed those who bothered 
to complain.133 Nowhere were the features of the guano trade as a typical 
labour repressive system more evident than in the guano agent’s handling 
of his administrative responsibilities.  
 
The disrespect shown to headmen gradually undermined their status 
in the eyes of their subordinates. As a result, most of them displayed their 
resistance by forcing their supervisors into a situation of false compliance 
with the stipulated regulations. This was particularly evident in the gap 
between the official records as represented by the island logbook and actual 
events on the islands that were never reported. When the guano island 
provisioning system broke down in late 1896, most headmen – out of 
concern for their charges– defied the bans regulating purchases from the 
mainland and allowed the killing of penguins and the collection of eggs. 
John Kay of Halifax Island also tried to obtain milk, meat and vegetables 
from the Germans on the mainland on his own account.134 Others illegally 
maintained their own livestock such as pigs and fed them from official 
stores. Upon its discovery, this was conveniently and strategically blamed 
on the captain of the Sea Bird.135 Very few of these incidents were ever 
reported. 
 
Misunderstanding these dynamics, Captain F.P. Jameson, a member 
of a Commission of Investigation into the working of the guano islands in 
1897, erroneously observed that there was not much supervision at the 
islands in the bay of Angra Pequena.136 These actions, however, won 
individual headmen the respect of their subordinates and placed the blame 
for the failures of the system squarely on the guano agent. The assignment 
of such blame against the assigned authority who was “within moral reach” 
but failed to act in assisting the marginalised, represented, as Scott has 
shown in another milieu, the critical moment in the progression of protest to 
direct challenge.137 
 
Following the complete breakdown of the provisioning system which 
left the workforce with insufficient fresh supplies for nearly seven months, 
the “weapons of the weak” – the constant grumblings, strategic “loafing”, 
and threats of work stoppages by the guano labour force – finally 
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crystallised into strike action in late 1896 and early 1897.138 The shortage of 
fresh meat, vegetables, lime juice and vinegar in particular, hastened the 
onset of scurvy on most of the islands including Possession, Halifax, 
Sinclair, Hollamsbird, Mercury and Ichaboe. Efforts to mitigate the situation 
by employing various survival strategies, such as grinding rice to meal in 
order to bake bread; catching fish from the lagoon; and employing extreme 
measures such as frying a gemsbok skin; provided only a small measure of 
relief and added dysentery to an already bad situation.139 This situation left 
the northern guano collection operations in total disarray. Confronted by 
official indifference from both Burr and Jackson, the workmen embarked on 
a series of 24-hour strikes. These actions, although essentially used as a 
defensive weapon aimed at restoring the supply system to its former 
standard, was also an offensive weapon and a response to the undermining 
of the value of their labour, especially the conditions of service which 
reduced the men to “penury and poverty before they even start”.140 
 
At the forefront of these strikes in March and April 1897 were white 
diggers who, over a long period of time, were foremost in articulating 
grievances on wages and provisioning. A close inspection of their remarks 
used during these times clearly indicates an acute awareness of their rights. 
Upon being confronted with the poor accommodation on the islands, for 
example, Burr commented that it was just “disgraceful and not fit for a 
human being”.141 Anthony Chimato, one of the headmen, regarded the 
accommodation as not even “fit for a nigger to live in”.142 Similarly the quality 
of the meat provided to the workers was described as an affront to any 
“British citizen” whilst the ship’s store system was described as a 
“nineteenth century disgrace” and the expectation that they sign a blank 
form to claim their accumulated earnings as something “the likes of it would 
not be allowed in a shipping office in England”.143 This confirmed Isaac 
Land’s contention that British seamen from the eighteenth to the nineteenth 
century were eager to re-establish their worth in the eyes of British society 
based on the argument that “no one who possessed the sensibility of a 
British man should be governed like a Black slave”.144 
 
The tactic of short work stoppages combined with the use of the 
colonial press to highlight their plight and their contrasting of the guano 
                                                            
138.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
A. Chimato, 30 July 1897. 
139.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
A. Chimato, 30 July 1897. 
140.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
Capt. Burr, 22 July 1897. 
141. KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
Capt. Burr, 22 July 1897. 
142. KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
A. Chimato, 30 July 1897. 
143.  KAB: AGR:667:0000, Guano Island Commission of 1897, Evidence: Testimony of 
J. Fletcher, 22 July 1897. 
144.  Land, “Customs of the Sea”, pp 169–185. 
71
Discontented Scoundrels 
71 
labour regime with accepted British practices, were chosen precisely to 
attract maximum public attention without threatening the dominant norms, 
laws, customs and political loyalty. It was also presented as a public act of 
compliance and conformity as well as, by implication, an effort to protect the 
“British way of doing things”. The action of the guano workers, however, 
also built on an existing tradition of labour organisation and collective 
resistance within the trade. Like the sailors during the period of ad hoc 
labour, during the second half of the nineteenth century, black guano 
workers on Navassa Island in the American Pacific, resisted and killed six 
white supervisors of the Navassa Phosphate Company in Baltimore 
following longstanding abuse and neglect.145 However, it was also a 
pragmatic form of resistance given the isolation of the islands and their 
distance from Cape Town. These factors combined to secure formal 
government intervention through the appointment of a special investigative 
commission to scrutinise the complete working of the islands – the Guano 
Island Commission of Inquiry (1897). 
 
The commission, in addition to revealing the harsh working and living 
conditions of workers, also exposed the systematic abuses of the 
administrative system by Jackson. Particularly disturbing was his habit of 
claiming repayment for worker salaries without submitting any detailed 
salary accounts.146 The colonial government, ignorant as it was of the finer 
workings of the guano extraction system, save for the reports from its top 
official, also failed to question the ever-increasing wage bill.147 It therefore 
became complicit in the maintenance of what had effectively become a 
coercive and exploitative labour system. These damning findings resulted in 
the abolition of the position of government guano agent as a commission-
earning entity and the placement of the guano island administration under 
the formal control of the Department of Agriculture. Forthwith, the guano 
labour regime was to be managed as a formal state-run operation governed 
by formal public sector regulations and practices consistent with those 
governing labour in the metropole. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Cape guano trade displayed features similar to those which prompted 
Phillips to describe the international guano trade as contributing to a new 
form of slavery. Private contractors designed a highly exploitative system 
characterised by extended credit; a system of half-pay notes; cash 
advances; rationing; and deferred payments. These were simply taken over 
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and refined by the guano agent in pursuit of higher profits and his own 
commission. The colonial government as the political authority failed in the 
duty of safeguarding colonial interests by providing virtually no oversight 
over the actions of the Cape businessmen involved in the trade and later, 
the actions of its own functionary. Owing to their hesitancy and failure to act 
in time, the colonial state became a slave to Jackson’s “guano experience” 
– an experience that cared solely for fast profit, rather than its labourers or 
even the sustainability of the system. 
 
Guided by growing awareness of their “rights” as whites, “British 
citizens” and “men”, guano labourers evinced agency in rejecting their 
exploitation at certain flashpoints and acting in their own defence. Through 
both subtle and overt forms of resistance, they attempted to frustrate the 
system that aimed to exploit them. In this regard, they had the example of 
co-workers in both the guano and other industries to follow in their struggle. 
This willingness to engage their employers physically drove the evolution of 
guano labour from an ad hoc to a formally structured regime. The 
experience of labour exploitation on the guano islands was indeed shared, 
uniting guano workers from South America to the northwest coast of Africa. 
Historiographically, it is therefore possible to use both the events locally and 
those elsewhere to make a final judgement about guano’s contribution to 
the institution of a new form of slavery, albeit for a very short time, until the 
new “slaves” themselves helped force its abolition. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The scraping of guano on offshore islands in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans 
during the mid- to late nineteenth century was an essentially primitive 
industry. As guano is a natural product with no further need for processing, 
the primary task of guano workers was the physical collection of guano 
chunks using basic tools such as crowbars, spades and wheelbarrows. 
Working on nearly barren islands with non-existent harbour facilities in 
remote areas far removed from its supply source, meant that guano-
collection was an extremely risky enterprise and guano-labour was both 
back breaking and hazardous labour. Motivated by profit considerations, 
guanopreneurs and the Cape colonial state established and maintained an 
exploitative and coercive labour regime characterised by the use of deferred 
wages, credit and rationing as well as rigid contract enforcement. Guano 
diggers, however, did not accept these practices passively and as this 
article demonstrates, actively resisted their exploitation and marginalisation. 
As a result, the Cape colonial authorities were compelled to intervene, 
changing the system in 1898. 
 
Keywords: guano; fertiliser; labour regime; slavery; resistance; Cape 
Colony; Ichaboe islands. 
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Opsomming 
 
Ghwanoversameling met behulp van basiese tegnologie (kruiwaens, pikke, 
grawe en koevoete)  op dikwels afgelëe en onherbergsame kuseilande aan 
die Atlantiese kus, het tot gevolg gehad dat die 19de eeuse bedryf tereg as 
primitief, en werksomstandighede as onaangenaam en lewensbedreigend 
beskryf is. Teneinde kostes laag te hou en maksimale voordeel uit die 
bedryf te verkry, het beide die Kaapse koloniale owerhede en ghwano-
entrepeneurs nie gehuiwer om werkers uit te buit en ‘n verdrukkende 
arbeidsbedeling gekenmerk deur voedselrantsoenering, kredietverlening, 
beperkende kontrakte en uitgestelde betalings in te stel en instand te hou 
nie. Verdermeer het hulle toegang tot die koloniale strafregstelsel gebruik 
om kontrakbreuk en drostery tot die minimum te beperk.  Die ghwano 
arbeidsmag het egter nie hierdie situasie stilswyend aanvaar nie en het, 
soos wat dit uit hierdie artikel blyk, hulle aktief teen uitbuiting en 
marginalisering verset. Gevolglik is die Kaapse owerhede gedwing om op te 
tree en met ingang vanaf 1898 die stelsel waarop die ghwanobedryf 
voortaan bestuur sou word, wesenlik verander. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: ghwano; bemesting; arbeidbedeling; verset; Kaap Kolonie; 
Ichaboe; eilande  
